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and Authority in Digital Search and
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“Privacy is not something that I’m merely entitled to, it’s
an absolute prerequisite.”
—Marlon Brando 1
“[T]here is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to
protect the privacy of us all.”
—Antonin Scalia 2
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INTRODUCTION
Even though very few Americans live alone, most of us keep
secrets. The United States Constitution guarantees that, absent a
probable cause determination, our secrets will remain unseen, unheard, and unknown by those from whom we wish to conceal
them. 3 The Supreme Court has seen fit to draw a few exceptions
3

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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to the search warrant requirement, and one of those is based on
consent. 4 An individual who wishes to cooperate with the police
and waive the requirement that officers obtain a warrant before
executing a search of her apartment is free to do so at her own risk.
The Court has recognized a number of rationales for this exception, but also certain caveats. 5 This Note explores the law of the
consent-search exception and some of the technological challenges
that make its application more difficult.
Assume, for the purposes of this Note, that the FBI suspects
George Costanza is involved in an identity theft ring. Given that
identity theft is a crime made much easier by modern technology,
there is a good chance that George’s computer contains e-mail and
other information that will confirm the agents’ suspicions. Surveillance by the FBI has neither provided enough evidence to obtain a
search warrant for George’s house nor a wiretap. George lives
with, and takes care of, his elderly mother in a home that she owns.
Hoping to catch a break, the agents visit George’s home while he
is at work and ask his mother whether she would consent to a
search of the home for evidence of George’s involvement in the
identity theft ring. George’s mother allows the agents to look
around. In the course of their search, and much to their surprise,
the agents discover a banker’s box full of printed documents that
implicate George in the identify theft ring. The box (which had no
lid on it, oddly) was sitting on the floor in a closet to which
George’s mother had unfettered access.
Provided that the consent was properly obtained and not coerced, does such a search violate George’s constitutional rights?
The scenario seems straightforward, and it is unlikely that George
would succeed in arguing that the agents unconstitutionally invaded his privacy. If the hypothetical documents were stored on a
computer, however, despite the fact that both a computer and a
banker’s box are essentially storage devices, is there something
special about the way the documents are stored that changes the
reasonableness of the search? Many courts have recognized that
there are substantial differences between the computer and the box,
4
5

Mitchell Waldman, AM. JUR. 2D Computers and the Internet § 21 (2008).
See id.
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yet the doctrine remains relatively the same for digital and physical
evidence. 6
In January of 2004, the federal government began investigating
Ray Andrus. 7 As a result of the investigation, and the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress evidence recovered from a computer, Mr. Andrus pled guilty to charges of possession of child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). 8 Mr.
Andrus lived with his parents, just like George Costanza above,
and the evidence was recovered from a computer kept in his bedroom. 9 And also similar to George’s case, it was Mr. Andrus’ father who consented to the search of the computer while his son was
away from the home. 10 On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Mr.
Andrus argued that the search was improper for a number of reasons, but ultimately the court, treating the computer very much like
a banker’s box, held in favor of the government over a short, but
intriguing dissent by Judge McKay. 11
Mr. Andrus argued unsuccessfully that, because the computer
was configured to require each user to logon with a unique password, the police should not have searched through files that were
contained on the hard drive under his user profile folder. 12 To
bring this argument somewhat in line with George’s case, suppose
that George had, instead of storing just loose papers in the banker’s
box, used manila envelopes to separate his papers from his
mother’s. The envelopes are not really secured, since anybody
with access to the box could easily open each envelope and read
the paper inside, but George marked the envelopes so his mother
would know where not to look. Likewise, George doesn’t intrude

6

See, e.g., Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing how the Fourth
Circuit has recognized that computer files should be treated with a high degree of privacy
protection, but generally looks at computers as physical devices); see also Orin S. Kerr,
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 538–40 (2005) (discussing the unique features of the computer hard drive as a file storage mechanism).
7
United States v. Andrus (Andrus), 438 F.3d 711, 713 (10th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc
denied, 499 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2007).
8
Id. at 712.
9
Id. at 713.
10
Id. at 712–14.
11
Id. at 711–25.
12
Id. at 715–22.
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on his mother’s private storage area. Admittedly, this analogy is
weak because it doesn’t encompass the complexities of the security
features the computer user is capable of implementing, but that is
part of the reason why computers are in fact different from other
storage devices.
And this is where the incredibly significant and terribly difficult conceptual difference between the physical evidence in
George’s case and the digital evidence in Mr. Andrus’s case becomes a hard legal question. The specifics of how the files stored
on the computer differ from those stored in the banker’s box are
discussed in detail below, but it is important to understand at the
outset of this discussion that there are no real analogs in the world
of physical evidence to the ways in which one can protect data on a
computer.
Today, computer users generally use passwords to control access to data, but fingerprints and other biometric mechanisms are
slowly being adopted as replacements. Users and software manufacturers have begun to take security more seriously, and users are
starting to exert more control over their data in an effort to keep
hackers and identity thieves from hurting them. Mr. Andrus’s use
of a password was intended to keep others from accessing his private data. In his case, however, it was as effective as George writing “Do Not Open: George’s Stuff” on a manila envelope containing his contraband.
As the doctrine of consent searching has evolved, so has the
evidence it seeks to uncover and the technologies used by police to
find that evidence. This Note explores the doctrine of consent
searching as it applies specifically to evidence recovered from a
computer that is shared among multiple members of a household.13
Part I provides the relevant background information on the current
state of computer technology vis-à-vis the two major operating
13

For the purposes of this Note, members of a household could, but need not be related. While there may be a slightly different analysis if the co-inhabitants are married,
those issues are beyond the scope of this Note. For an overview of how a spousal relationship may be treated differently, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE COMPUTER CRIME &
INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION CRIMINAL DIV., SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (July 2002), available at
http://www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL].
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systems in wide home use, the software that police use in forensic
examinations of computer systems, and the scholarship and case
law relevant to the discussion. In Part II, the article moves to a
discussion of the two-pronged debate which surrounds the searching of computer systems pursuant to consent by one of the computer’s users, which was most recently highlighted in United States
v. Andrus. 14 Finally, Part III sets forward a framework within
which law enforcement agents can simultaneously achieve their
goals and maintain the privacy protections the Constitution requires.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Observations About the State of Home Computing
More and more our modern lives require us to own and use
many different types of technology. The mobile phones that allow
teenagers to constantly send text messages to each other in lieu of
actual conversation are more powerful than the family computers
of the early 1990s. Though it may have been forced to endure
many upgrades, the family computer remains a requirement for
most. Microsoft still, as it has for many years, dominates the operating system market, and most home computers run some version
of Microsoft’s Windows operating system. 15 In recent years, Apple has secured a larger portion of the market, which means that
any home computer that might be the target of police investigation
will more probably than not run Windows or the Mac OS. 16 Due
to concerns that many users have expressed over the security of

14

Andrus, 438 F.3d at 722.
OneStat Website Statistics and Website Metrics, http://www.onestat.com/html/
aboutus_pressbox46-operating-systems-market-share.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2008).
16
As of the writing of this Note, the operating system shipped with all new Apple
computers is called Mac OS X. See, e.g., Apple—Get a Mac—Why a Mac,
http://www.apple.com/getamac/whymac (last visited Sept. 13, 2008). Sometimes it is
referred to as System X (roman numeral ten) because the version of the operating system
immediately preceding it was System 9. See Posting of Rich Brown to Crave Blog,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-17938_105-9936378-1.html (May 5, 2008, 2:51 PM PDT);
see also Wikipedia—Mac OS, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mac_OS (last visited Sept.
13, 2008).
15
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their computer files, both operating systems have been designed
from the ground up with security in mind.
Microsoft Windows XP is the most common operating system
in use today, and it was designed specifically to be a multi-user
home computer operating system. 17 Microsoft envisioned XP as
the hub of digital life and the digital family, and as such incorporated design features that would make multi-user operation simple. 18 The hallmark of multi-user computing is some division of
computer resources among the users of a computer. Users of parallel-processing supercomputers and mainframes may know that
resources are normally divided up based on the amount of CPU
time 19 that will be needed to complete a given operation, but the
home PC environment is structured quite differently. At home,
family members generally interact with the computer one at a time,
and so a simple division of space on the computer’s hard drive suffices to allocate the computer’s resources. But to access these individual allocations, Mom, Dad, and each of the kids need to have
his or her own username. Both Windows and the Mac OS allow
multiple usernames on the same computer, and users are required
to authenticate, normally with a password, in order to access the
files stored within their allocation on the computer.
During the initial setup phase of the operating system, which
happens when the end-user first powers on the computer, both
Windows and Mac OS requires the user to set a password for his or
17

According to a recent survey, many corporate workstations run Windows XP. Gregg
Keizer, Vista’s Biggest Problem Remains Windows XP, Survey Says, PC WORLD, Nov.
14, 2007, http://www.pcworld.com/article/139664/article.html. Home users have been
reluctant to upgrade to Microsoft Windows Vista from XP, believing that XP is a more
stable operating system. See Harry McCracken, Windows XP vs. Vista: An Explosion of
Opinion, PC WORLD, Mar. 20, 2008, http://www.pcworld.com/article/143414/
windows_xp_vs_vista_an_explosion_of_opinion.html. According to a study conducted
in 2006, Windows XP has a “global usage share of 86.80 [%].” OneStat Website Statistics, supra note 15.
18
See Jim Hu & Mike Ricciuti, Gates Takes Wrap Off Windows XP, CNET, Oct. 25,
2001, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1001-274939.html.
19
CPU Time is “[t]he amount of time the CPU is actually executing instructions.”
What is CPU Time?—A Word Definition from the Webopedia Computer Dictionary,
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/C/CPU_time.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008); see
also Wikipedia—CPU Time, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CPU_time (last visited Aug.
25, 2008).
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her account. 20 The user may then create as many additional accounts as needed and set a unique password for each of them.
Even outside of the operating system itself, passwords are a part of
life for computer users, as most major web sites require users to
register in order to read articles, buy goods, or simply interact with
the site.
There are two main exceptions to the general rule that multiple
user accounts on today’s common home computers will have userassigned passwords. The first is that some users enable the autologon feature of their operating system, eschewing multiple user
accounts for one family account. 21 Such a configuration means
that Mom, Dad, and all the kids share access to all Internet bookmarks stored by the web browser, e-mail account profiles in the email reader, and all settings in the various programs. When such a
configuration is chosen, the account will usually be setup to logon
automatically when the computer starts. Such configurations are
much more common, however, with computers operated by single
users, as opposed to in a multi-user environment. 22 One important
technical question is whether it is possible, and feasible, to identify
these different configurations before conducting a search of the
data stored on the computer.
The second exception where multiple users may share a computer without individual passwords is a situation in which the
computer’s administrator has configured the accounts such that users cannot change their passwords. 23 This is a common configuration in a corporate environment where multiple employees work
different shifts at the same stations. It may also present itself in
educational settings or even at home where a parent wants to maintain access to a child’s account to monitor his or her activity. 24
20

This initial account will be a computer administrator and provide “full control of the
PC . . . .” Windows XP, http://itproxy.org/pcguide/msos/winxp.htm (last visited Oct .28,
2008).
21
See, e.g., Mark Kaelin, Set Up an Automatic Logon to Windows XP, TECHREPUBLIC,
May 4, 2004, http://articles.techrepublic.com.com/5100-1035_11-5280112.html.
22
See id.
23
The administrator creates the username and password, thus making the account private. Windows XP, supra note 20.
24
This scenario is analogous to a situation where the unlocked child’s room contains a
locked dresser, but the parent has a key and unlocks it before the police search through it.
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The recommended configuration for a family computer, despite
the possibility for alternatives, is to configure the computer with
separate accounts for each family member so that they may maintain their independent bookmarks, e-mail, and data. 25 One user
may further expect that if she has a unique password for her account, the other family members will not be able to access her data
unless she divulges the password to them. 26 The security features
of the operating system generally prohibit one user from accessing
another user’s data folders unless that user has explicitly given
permission to the other. 27 Granting other users permission to access data is possible with both Windows and the Mac OS, but by
default each user’s data will be protected from prying eyes.
In the common multi-user configuration, each user account is
linked to specific folders on the computer that are used for data
storage. 28 On a Windows PC, these folders can be found in the
“Documents and Settings” folder, located in the root directory of
the hard drive. If one user were to open the main “Documents and
Settings” folder, she would see folders created for each additional
user on the system but, unless she had been given special security
privileges by the folder’s owner, she would not be able to open any
folder but the one linked to her account. The operating system
maintains a certain amount of metadata that relates to the permissions for each file and folder. 29 When an unauthorized user atIn that regard, the situation mentioned above is outside the technical bounds of this Note;
however, the investigative principles laid out in the Conclusion, if followed, would effectively discover the configuration and allow the agents to work within the bounds of the
Constitution while eliminating the possibility of a challenge to their search. For a discussion of the differences between physical and computer searches, see Kerr supra note 6, at
538–50.
25
Tips to Protect Kids Online—Microsoft Security, http://www.microsoft.com/protect/
family/guidelines/basics.mspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
26
Users have the option of configuring their accounts as “private” which makes them
“inaccessible to other users.” Windows XP, supra note 20.
27
See id.
28
Id.; see also Wikipedia—User Profile, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_profile
(last visited Sept. 9, 2008).
29
Metadata, in this context, means the information which is not a part of the file itself
but rather is tracked by the operating system for purposes of file management, specifically security. Chris Taylor, An Introduction to Metadata (July 29, 2003),
http://www.library.uq.edu.au/iad/ctmeta4.html; see also Wikipedia—Metadata, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Metadata (last visited Sept. 9, 2008).
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tempts to open a document for which she does not have permission, the operating system interrupts the request and denies the
user access. Based on the way the operating system functions to
protect the user’s data, she may expect that her files are secure and
will remain private. 30
B. Why Digital Evidence Poses Unique Problems
In the time before the atom, what we could see with our eyes
was all there was. Similarly, when the country was young and the
universe of searchable data was limited to “papers, and effects,”
law enforcement agents were able to literally see everything covered by Fourth Amendment protections. 31 As technology has developed, however, the fundamental building blocks of data have
changed. As the discovery of the atom gave way to a whole new
world of life, the use of bits, bytes, hard drives, and computers has
provided many challenges for search and seizure law.
The most interesting, and legally problematic, feature of computer-based evidence is that it can be classified both physically and
logically. One can look at the data contained on a computer from
two very different perspectives, and the choice to treat the evidence one way or the other can lead to very different legal outcomes. In his article addressing this dichotomy, Professor Orin
Kerr examined a number of the different considerations that must
be addressed before deciding which perspective to adopt. 32 On
one hand, the computer’s hard drive, like the computer itself, is a
physical piece of equipment. Despite the fact that the courts routinely do so, however, analogizing the hard drive to any other piece
of physical evidence ignores its unique characteristics.33 Kerr
identified four main differences between computer evidence and

30

The Mac OS has a similar scheme for organizing data. For a detailed description of
how the operating system is organized, see An Introduction to Mac OS X Security for
Web Developers, http://developer.apple.com/internet/security/securityintro.html (Oct. 28,
2008).
31
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32
Kerr, supra note 6.
33
See United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc denied, 499 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th
Cir. 2001).
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traditional physical evidence: first, searches of computer evidence
normally occur outside of the place being searched; second, investigators can create exact duplicates of seized hard drives; third,
hard drives have immense capacity, well beyond any other physical device; and fourth, there are procedural technicalities that make
searching a hard drive far more difficult than searching other
physical evidence. 34
How the courts equate files to “papers” can mean a world of
difference in a criminal case.35 Thinking back to the banker’s box
hypothetical, assume that there were different folders for each victim in the identity theft ring stored in the box. Generally, we could
think of each folder as containing a “file” pertaining to one of the
victims. In this case, a file is a compilation of papers stored within
a container, the folder. 36 It is equally valid, however, to think of
each individual piece of paper as a file stored within the container
of the folder. These different conceptions of how to apply the
word “file” in the physical wolrd are really semantic, but in the
digital world the name given to a particular block of data can have
enormous consequences. 37 These distinctions are critically important in determining whether the scope of one party’s consent has
been exceeded by the search.
In judging the reasonableness of a consent search, courts must
examine the scope of the original consent. The scope of a search
of someone’s home “is largely intuitive; it correlates neatly with
what is hidden and what is exposed.” 38 Unlike a physical search
where once the closet door is opened the banker’s box is visible to
everyone, in the digital world, where files can have individual se-

34

Kerr, supra note 6, at 538–47.
Id. But see Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer
Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193, 198 (2005) (arguing that evaluating the legality of searches and seizures of computer evidence need not be
any different from evaluating the legality of paper searches).
36
Kerr analogizes folders to zippered pockets within a briefcase. Kerr, supra note 6, at
555.
37
See id. at 554 (discussing the differences between the logical and virtual approaches
to looking at data contained on a hard drive). By treating the data contained on a hard
drive as a virtual file cabinet, each individual folder and/or file can have specific security
properties in addition to the properties set for the entire drive. Id.
38
Id.
35
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curity settings or be situated such that one user may not normally
be able to access them, what is exposed in plain view to one user
may be hidden to every other user. But there are technologies that
allow computer technicians to expose certain areas of a hard drive
where data might normally be invisible to one or a group of users. 39
In a typical investigation where computers are seized, the evidence may be collected from one location and then transported to
another for the actual search.40 When law enforcement officers
conduct a search of a home, they are generally looking for evidence which they can discern as relevant based on physically observable characteristics. Because the data stored on a hard drive
cannot be identified without the use of a computer, the act of
searching the drive normally does not occur on-site, but at the investigators’ own laboratory. 41
C. Some Basics of The Forensic Investigation Process 42
The well-equipped computer forensic investigator has many
tools at her disposal that can be used to dig up information that
computer users are trying to hide. Probably the simplest of these
tools is a disk duplicator or imager. A trained investigator only
works off of a copy of an original hard drive. 43 Unlike physical
evidence that one would expect would be collected at a crime
scene (e.g., blood, bullets, knives), a properly made copy of a hard
39

There are many software programs that are designed to bypass the user-password
protection on a computer for purposes of forensic analysis and maintenance. As noted by
the court in Andrus, one such program is Guidance Software’s EnCase program, which is
a computer forensic analysis utility. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 719 (10th
Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc denied, 499 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2007). In addition, utilities
like Technology Pathways’ ProDiscover, AccessData’s Forensic Toolkit, and a free program created by Brian Carrier called The Sleuthkit can all be used by a computer user to
bypass user-level security features. See Forensic Toolkit, http://www.accessdata.com (last
visited Oct. 28, 2008); Sleuth Kit and Autopsy, http://www.sleuthkit.org (last visited Oct.
28,
2008);
Technology
Pathways
ProDiscover
Computer
Forensics,
http://www.techpathways.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
40
See Kerr, supra note 6, at 551, 557.
41
See id.
42
Empirical research in support of this section was conducted by the author with the
gracious help of Luke Cats, Vice President, Stroz Friedberg.
43
Kerr, supra note 6, at 557.
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drive can be relied upon as a complete and accurate representation
of the original. 44 Since these copies are exact replicas of the original, investigators can use the copies for their analysis and thus not
risk damaging the suspect’s hard drive. 45 The forensic duplication
process allows investigators to make an infinite number of lossless
duplicates. Unlike a photocopy, there is no degradation in quality
each time one of the copies is copied. These copies are generally
called “images” or “bitstreams” and are created with disk imaging
software or hardware. 46
Many new computers sold today come with hard drives that
can store over 320 gigabytes of data. 47 Considering that one gigabyte is approximately equivalent to 1,000 books, 48 a single computer could potentially store one percent of the books in the Library of Congress, far more than could physically be stored in the
average house. 49 With that much data to search through, a typical
computer forensic investigation can take much more time and be
far more complex than searching for the equivalent physical evidence. 50
To conduct and manage the search of a computer hard drive,
the investigator will normally use a software suite specifically de-

44

See Equity Analytics, LLC v. Lundin, 248 F.R.D. 331, 334 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting
that the general process of forensic duplication creates an identical copy of the original).
45
See id.
46
See Kerr, supra note 6, at 557; Wikipedia—Disk Image, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Disk_image (last visited Aug. 25, 2008).
47
See, e.g., Apple—Mac Pro—Tech Specs, http://www.apple.com/macpro/specs.html
(last visited Oct. 28, 2008); Gateway Official Site: Shop—Desktops—GT Series,
http://www.gateway.com/systems/series/529598054.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
48
One gigabyte is approximately the equivalent of 300,000 pages of text or approximately five minutes of high-definition video. See LexisNexis Discovery Servs., How
Many Pages in a Gigabyte? (2007), http://www.lexisnexis.com/AppliedDiscovery/lawlibrary/whitePapers/ADI_FS_PagesInAGigabyte.pdf; VideoSpace Online, http://
www.videospaceonline.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2008).
49
The Library of Congress contains more than 30 million books. General Information—About the Library, http://www.loc.gov/about/generalinfo.html#2007_at_a_glance
(last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
50
See generally Douglas A. Schmitknecht, Building FBI Computer Forensics Capacity: One Lab at a Time, 1 DIGITAL INVESTIGATION 177, available at http://www.
rcfl.gov/Downloads/Documents/DigitalInvestigator.pdf; FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
REGIONAL COMPUTER FORENSICS LABORATORY ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007
34–67 (2007), http://www.rcfl.gov/downloads/documents/RCFL_Nat_Annual07.pdf.
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signed for forensic analysis. 51 The market leader in this area is
Guidance Software’s “EnCase” product. 52 This software is, at its
core, a very powerful search engine. It is designed to allow an investigator to examine every bit of data stored on a hard drive, including data the user may have deleted or otherwise tried to hide. 53
EnCase is able to read the data from an image of the original drive
and display it in various ways. 54 Because there are many ways one
can hide data on a computer hard drive, one of the most effective
ways to use EnCase is to create a list of keywords that the software
will search for, bit-by-bit, across the entirety of the hard drive. 55
When an investigator uses the keyword search function, EnCase attempts to locate all instances of the specified words wherever they appear on the drive, whether they exist in active files, deleted files, or unused space on the drive. However, there is one
notable limitation on this process. The software is generally unable to search through encrypted files or data. 56 If a user employs
strong encryption to protect her data, the EnCase program will not
be able to search anything except the metadata. 57 Home users are
likely to rely on the operating system’s password and account con-

51

See Kerr, supra note 6, at 544.
See Guidance Software, EnCase Forensic (2005), http://www.guidancesoftware.
com/downloads/EnCase_Forensic.pdf; Guidance Software, http://www.encase.com (last
visited Oct. 28, 2008).
53
Guidance Software, EnCase Forensic, supra note 52, at 2.
54
The term “image” is used interchangeably with “copy” or “bitstream.” For a brief
overview of the significance of this process, see Kerr, supra note 6, at 557–58.
55
When used in conjunction with a search warrant, EnCase can be an extremely powerful tool for locating the data for which the investigators have a warrant. There are limits even to those searches which are beyond the scope of this Note. For a more detailed
discussion of the ways search warrants can be exceeded by EnCase, see Kerr, supra note
6, at 548–57.
56
Guidance Software, Encase Detail Products Description (2006), http://www.
guidancesoftware.com/products/ee_index.aspx.
57
Strong encryption refers to any form of encryption algorithm that is mathematically
difficult to attack. Generally, an algorithm which uses a key of greater than 128-bits is
considered strong. See Encryption Level—Silly Dog 701, http://sillydog.org/netscape/kb/
encryption.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008); Wikipedia—Encryption, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Encryption (last visited Aug. 25, 2008).
52
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trols, rather than special data encryption software, to secure their
data. 58
EnCase is not just a glorified search engine; it is a full-featured
forensic analysis suite with an extensive scripting language called
EnScript. 59 One of the scripts included with the program is the
“Case Processor” script. 60 This script, when executed by an investigator, will extract information about the computer system’s configuration so that the investigator knows crucial details like which
version of the operating system is installed, the time when the
computer was last turned off and on, and the number and names of
the user accounts active on the system. 61 The last of these is of
critical importance. The Case Processor script provides the investigator with all of this information in a very short period of time. 62
The current version of EnCase includes additional investigative
functionality that makes it very easy for an investigator to quickly
determine what accounts have been created on the computer and
whether there are passwords configured to protect those accounts. 63

58

A survey conducted by a user on ubuntuforums.org showed that an overwhelming
majority of respondents did not feel a need to encrypt their data. Poll: How Many People
Use Hard Drive Encryption?, http://ubuntuforums.org/showthread.php?t=661517 (last
visited Aug. 25, 2008).
59
Guidance Software, EnCase Forensic Detailed Product Description (2006), http://
www.guidancesoftware.com/downloads/DetailedProductDescription.pdf.
60
Guidance Software does not provide a public list of the EnScripts that are bundled
with each version of the EnCase software, but this Note’s author, while researching for
this Note, used an out-of-the-box installation of EnCase version 6.5.1.2 which included
the Case Processor EnScript. Screencaptures of EnCase version 6.5.1.2 are on file with
this Note’s author.
61
Based on this Note’s author’s use of the Case Processor EnScript on EnCase version
6.5.1.2.
62
A laboratory test of EnCase version 6.5.1.2 (conducted by this Note’s author)
showed that the Case Processor, executed on a 20 gigabyte Windows partition, takes approximately 30 seconds to identify and record all of the information. Screencaptures of
EnCase version 6.5.1.2 are on file with this Note’s author.
63
Using EnCase version 6.5.1.2, an investigator can use the “User List” function available through the “Secure Storage” tab to identify all of the user accounts on the system.
In addition to listing the users on the system, the “User List” function also displays a hash
of the account’s password, if there is one. For accounts that are not password-protected,
this field is blank in the user list. Screencaptures of EnCase version 6.5.1.2 are on file
with this Note’s author.
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Unlike encrypted data, however, these password-protected
folders are easily searchable by EnCase. 64 Even though the program can be used to look at the metadata that tracks which users
are allowed to access particular files, EnCase is not designed to respect those permissions. Investigators can use EnCase to search
through files that are stored in places they would not otherwise be
able to look. The software would, in essence, be crippled if it
couldn’t search through the entire hard drive looking for incriminating evidence.
Again, it is difficult to conceive a parallel in the physical world
to how this software functions, but assume that George’s banker’s
box is locked somehow. In fact, it’s more like a safe that looks incredibly secure when it’s sitting on the floor, but when the agents
pick it up they find that the bottom is completely translucent. They
are then able to see into the safe, and by shaking it the right way,
they can expose and inspect each and every piece of paper. Consider whether such a search would be unconstitutional.
D. The Evolution of the Consent Search Doctrine
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that all citizens are free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” 65 The amendment also contains the warrant clause, which
describes certain requirements a search warrant must meet in order
to pass constitutional review. 66 That these requirements were
spelled out in the text of the amendment led the Supreme Court to
deem warrantless searches per se unreasonable. 67 Over time, a
number of exceptions have been carved out of the general rule
against warrantless searches. One exception to this rule is that a
search conducted pursuant to an owner’s voluntary consent is not
unreasonable. 68 In Zap v. United States, 69 the Court upheld a warrantless search based on consent provided as a condition to obtain
64

Based on this Note’s author’s use of EnCase version 6.5.1.2. Screencaptures of EnCase version 6.5.1.2 are on file with this Note’s author.
65
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
66
Id.
67
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393–94 (1914).
68
Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 626–28 (1946).
69
Zap, 328 U.S. at 626–28.
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a government contract. 70 The landmark case Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte 71 held that the non-owner driver of a car could verbally consent to a search of the car and that evidence retrieved
from the trunk was admissible against him. 72
Further development of the consent search doctrine has come
from cases where the consenter was not an occupant of the property being searched. In Stoner v. California, 73 consent given by a
hotel clerk did not effectively waive the guest’s Fourth Amendment rights. 74 The Stoner Court was not convinced “that the night
clerk had been authorized by the petitioner to permit the police to
search the petitioner’s room.” 75 The Court was unwilling to allow
“the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . to be eroded by
strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealistic doctrines of ‘apparent authority.’” 76
At issue in United States v. Matlock 77 was whether a consenter
must have actual ownership of a home in order for her consent to
be valid. 78 The Matlock Court expanded the consent search doctrine to include consent given by non-owners who “possess[]
common authority” over the place to be searched. 79 The Court
made clear that the authority to consent to a search does not stem
from “the mere property interest” that the consenter may have, but
instead is based on an assumption of risk that co-inhabitants make
by virtue of sharing access to the common areas of a home. 80
But the Fourth Circuit was quick to restrict the Matlock consent-search doctrine, and in United States v. Block 81 held that a
mother did not have the authority to consent to a search of her
twenty-three-year-old son’s locked footlocker even though she
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
Id. at 248.
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 488.
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
Id. at 166–68.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 171 n.7.
United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978).
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could consent to a search of his room. 82 The court had defined the
scope of the mother’s consent to include only the areas she had actual access to, and it was clearly discernable by the agents that she
had no access to the locker. 83 A question still remained, however,
as to the scope of consent when it is not clear to the agents whether
the consenter had actual authority over the items to be searched. 84
In the circuit courts, Matlock was interpreted to mean that consent by one co-inhabitant was binding on all co-inhabitants. 85
Post-Matlock, even a co-inhabitant with equal authority over a
home could not effectively object to a search when another coinhabitant had authorized it. 86 While this interpretation held for a
majority of circuits, the Fourth Circuit held in State v. Leach 87 that
Matlock applied only to co-inhabitants who were not present during the search, and thus a search conducted pursuant to the consent
of one co-inhabitant, but without the consent of another present coinhabitant, was unconstitutional. 88
1. Matlock Revised: Objections Over Consent
Most recently, in Georgia v. Randolph, 89 the Court took on the
competing interpretations of Matlock as it pertains to whether a coinhabitant’s consent can override another co-inhabitant’s objection
to a search. 90 The Randolph Court held that consent by one coinhabitant can be invalidated by a present objecting co-

82

Id. at 541.
Id. at 540–41.
84
Jason M. Ferguson, Article and Survey: Randolph v. Georgia: The Beginning of a
New Era in Third-Party Consent Cases, 31 NOVA L. REV. 605, 612–13 (2007).
85
See id. at 615–17.
86
Id. at 615 (“[C]ourts expanded the application of the Matlock standard to provide
that a person with common authority over property may permit a warrantless search by
law enforcement even if the defendant has equal authority over the property, is present at
the time of the search, and specifically objects to the search.”).
87
State v. Leach, 113 Wash. 2d 735 (Wash. 1989).
88
Id. at 736 (“At issue is the validity of a warrantless search where consent is obtained
from a third party who possesses some control over the premises, but the defendant, who
has superior control, is present at the time the search is conducted. We hold the police
must obtain the consent of a cohabitant who is present and able to object in order to effect
a valid warrantless search.”).
89
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
90
Id. at 108–23.
83

VOL19_BOOK1_STANLEY

2008]

12/3/2008 12:07:44 PM

DIGITAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE

197

inhabitant. 91
The Court took the opportunity presented in
Randolph to clarify Matlock and what common authority actually
means. 92 While recognizing that common authority is somewhat
based on a property interest, the Court noted that the reasonableness of a search predicated on the consent of a co-inhabitant is
rooted in notions of “widely shared social expectations.” 93 The
Randolph Court reasoned that, when co-inhabitants cannot agree
on whether to consent to a search, the “resolution must come
through voluntary accommodation, not by appeals to authority.” 94
In reinforcing the right of one co-inhabitant to override another’s
consent to search, the Court was quick to caveat that the social expectations test need not be applied to cases of domestic violence or
other exigent circumstances that would give the police the right to
enter a home over the consent of one co-inhabitant. 95 Thus, in the
modern era, whether a consent search is unreasonable as to a coinhabitant is to be evaluated based on the inhabitants’ social expectations and the law enforcement officer’s reasonable inquiry into
the validity of the consenter’s access.
2. Illinois v. Rodriguez—Establishing Apparent Authority
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 96 the Court clarified Matlock’s other
open question about a consenter’s authority to allow police access
to a home. 97 The Court expanded on Matlock by holding that police officers need only use reasonable care in determining whether
a consenting individual possesses the requisite authority to sanction a search. 98
In July of 1985, Mr. Rodriguez “was arrested in his apartment
by law enforcement officers and charged with possession of illegal
91

Id. at 122–23.
Id. at 108–23.
93
Id. at 111.
94
Id. at 114.
95
Id. at 118–19; see also Renee E. Williams, Note, Third Party Consent Searches after
Georgia v. Randolph: Dueling Approaches to the Dueling Roommates, 87 B.U. L. REV.
937, 949 (2007).
96
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
97
See id. at 179 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14 (1974)) .
98
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186; see also Georgetown Univ. Law Center, Warrantless
Searches and Seizures, 36 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 38, 78 n.250 (2007).
92

VOL19_BOOK1_STANLEY

198

12/3/2008 12:07:44 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 19:179

drugs.” 99 The officers had been called “to the residence of Dorothy Jackson” to respond to an alleged assault perpetrated upon her
daughter (Gail Fischer) by Mr. Rodriguez. 100 Throughout the subsequent police interview, Ms. Fischer led the police to believe that
she shared an apartment with Mr. Rodriguez.101 Fischer then led
the police to the apartment and let them in with her key.102 When
the police entered, they found drug paraphernalia in plain view as
well as containers of cocaine. 103 The police had never sought to
obtain either a search warrant for Rodriguez’s apartment or an arrest warrant for Rodriguez himself. 104
At trial, Rodriguez argued that Fischer was not a resident of the
apartment, citing the fact that she had moved out several weeks before. 105 The court agreed, holding that Fischer “was not a ‘usual
resident’ but rather an ‘infrequent visitor’ at the apartment,” and
granted his motion to suppress all the evidence collected from the
apartment. 106 The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the trial
court’s decision and the Supreme Court of Illinois declined to review the case. 107
In its opinion, the Unites States Supreme Court reversed the
trial court’s decision, holding that the Fourth Amendment is not
violated when law enforcement agents “reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who has consented to their entry is
a resident of the premises . . . .” 108 Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, balanced the logic of Stoner against Matlock by noting first,
that the question in cases of apparent authority is not whether an
individual has waived her Fourth Amendment rights, but rather

99

Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179.
Id.
101
Id. (“During this conversation, Fischer several times referred to the apartment on
South California as ‘our’ apartment, and said that she had clothes and furniture there. It
is unclear whether she indicated that she currently lived at the apartment, or only that she
used to live there.”).
102
Id. at 180.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 186.
100
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whether those rights were unreasonably violated, and second, that
law enforcement officers may not assume that an individual possesses authority over a premises just because she says she does. 109
Instead, the officers’ actions must comport with a more objective,
reasonable man standard. 110
3. Evaluating Consent: What is The Social Expectations Test?
The concept of individual privacy rights being established by
social norms is fundamental to the evaluation of Fourth Amendment cases, though it has by no means defined them. As the Court
noted in Rakas v. Illinois, 111 an individual’s legitimate expectation
of privacy “must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment,
either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or
to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” 112
Justice Harlan specifically noted in Katz v. United States 113 that the
two-fold test for determining whether a particular intrusion offends
the Fourth Amendment is based first on whether the individual had
a subjective expectation of privacy, and second whether “society is
prepared to recognize [it] as ‘reasonable.’” 114
The Randolph majority noted that, in the application of the
Fourth Amendment to disputes over searches and seizures, “[t]he
constant element . . . in the consent cases, then, is the great significance given to widely shared social expectations . . . .” 115 The
Court posited that if an acquaintance were to show up on your
doorstep and ask to come in, but your roommate stood in the
doorway actively protesting, it would be, at the very least, a confusing situation for the acquaintance. 116 As a result, “no sensible
person would go inside,” unless some evidence of a life- or limbthreatening situation was apparent. 117 The resulting “customary

109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Id. at 187–88.
Id. at 188–89.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
Id. at 143 n.12.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 103, 111 (2006).
Id. at 113–14.
Id. at 113.
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social understanding” is that when a co-inhabitant is present, she
may successfully bar the police from entering a home, but when
she steps away from the property (provided the police have not coerced her absence), her privacy rests in her co-inhabitant’s
hands. 118
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in Randolph sharply criticized
the majority’s application of the social expectations test, as he believed it was “not a promising foundation on which to ground a
constitutional rule . . . .” 119 Instead, Roberts argued that the Court
ought to have evaluated this case based on whether Randolph possessed a “‘legitimate expectation of privacy’” in the shared
space. 120 That expectation, according to Roberts, does not exist for
a co-inhabitant in a shared space. 121 Roberts argued that, while
one might “trust” her co-inhabitant to not allow the police to
search a shared space, it is not legitimate for her to expect that the
trust will not be violated. 122 While there may be many social
norms that people tend to adhere to with regard to shared secrets,
the Constitution does not recognize them—it merely recognizes
that privacy interest which protects shared information only “at the
discretion of the confidant.” 123 Seemingly in anticipation of future
cases dealing with evidence stored on shared computers, Roberts
specifically opined that, if a computer is shared between two coinhabitants, they have ceded their expectations of privacy vis-à-vis
each other. 124 His dissent did not, however, discuss this theory as
applied to a computer that had been password-protected in the way
that many home computers are.

118

Id. at 120; see also Williams, supra note 95, at 949.
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 130; see also Williams, supra note 95, at 950.
120
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 131 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (first emphasis added) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978)).
121
Id. (“Our common social expectations may well be that the other person will not, in
turn, share what we have shared with them with another—including the police—but that
is the risk we take in sharing.”).
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. (“If two roommates share a computer and one keeps pirated software on a shared
drive, he might assume that his roommate will not inform the government. But that person has given up his privacy with respect to his roommate by saving the software on their
shared computer.”).
119
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4. Exceeding the Scope of the Consent
The US Department of Justice maintains a cybercrime website
that prominently features a manual which was created to aid law
enforcement officers in conducting investigations that involve digital evidence and/or computer systems. 125 The manual extensively
catalogues the legal landmines surrounding the acquisition and use
of computer evidence in criminal matters. 126 The first section of
the manual is devoted to “searching and seizing computers without
a warrant” and includes an extensive discussion of the rules of
consent searches as applied to computers. 127
In United States v. Jacobsen, 128 the Supreme Court held that a
third-party’s consent to allow the police to look inside a package
under the third-party’s control was valid.129 The Jacobsen Court,
mindful of the difference between the third-party’s search and the
subsequent government action, clearly established the rule that
government searches cannot exceed the scope of the initial private
search. 130 Extending this precedent to a computer system, the DOJ
Manual concludes that if a third-party has access to a computer,
her consent can reasonably provide the basis for a search of the
computer. 131 One caveat, however, is that under the Jacobsen rule,
agents must often “inquire into third parties’ rights of access” prior
to initiating a search. 132 A second caveat is that agents must identify those areas to which the third-party has access and generally
cannot search areas beyond the scope of common authority. 133

125

DOJ MANUAL, supra note 13.
Id.
127
Id. at pt. (I).
128
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
129
Id. at 120–21.
130
Id. at 115–16 (citing Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980)).
131
DOJ MANUAL, supra note 13, at pt. (I)(C)(1)(b)(i) (“Agents may view what the third
party may see without violating any reasonable expectation of privacy so long as they
limit the search to the zone of the consenting third party’s common authority.”) (citation
omitted); see also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119–20.
132
DOJ MANUAL, supra note 13, at pt. (I)(C)(1)(b)(i).
133
United States v. Block held “that a mother could consent to a general search of her
23-year-old son’s room, but could not consent to a search of a locked footlocker found in
the room.” DOJ MANUAL, supra note 13, at pt. (I)(C)(1)(b)(i) (citing United States v.
Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978)); see also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115.
126
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This doctrine was specifically extended by the Fourth Circuit
to cover computer systems where multiple users have passwordprotected accounts. 134 In Trulock v. Freeh, 135 two people shared
access to one computer system and, during the course of the interrogation, the police learned that they did not share their account
passwords. 136 The Trulock court held that, because the investigating agents were aware that the party consenting to the search did
not have access to the other party’s files, the “consent . . . was insufficient to permit the search of Trulock’s private computer
files.” 137 Rooting their analysis in an application of United States
v. Block, 138 the circuit court determined that, even though the consenter in Trulock could legitimately “consent to a general search of
the computer, her authority did not extend to Trulock’s passwordprotected files.” 139 The court did not address whether the consent
would have been invalid had the investigating agents not discovered the password-protection scheme during their interview.
Another distinction that some defendants have raised is the difference between data stored on their computer and data stored on
external media like floppy disks or CD-ROMs. These defendants
then challenge searches on both fairness and constitutional
grounds. 140 The courts have been unwilling to suppress external
media recovered by the police pursuant to warrants that allow for
the seizure of computer “equipment.” 141 As the Tenth Circuit
noted, there exists “no authority finding that computer disks and
hard drives are closed containers somehow separate from the com-

134

Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 403.
136
Id. at 398.
137
Id. at 399.
138
Block, 590 F.2d 535.
139
Trulock, 275 F.3d at 403; see also Block, 590 F.2d at 541.
140
See, e.g., United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that a
second warrant for co-located computer disks was unnecessary when the police were authorized to search the computer); United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th
Cir. 1998) (holding that external media were considered computer “equipment” and
within the scope of the search warrant); United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746–47 (9th
Cir. 1997) (a warrant allowing for a seizure of computer equipment was sufficient to allow for a seizure of disks).
141
Simpson, 152 F.3d at 1248.
135

VOL19_BOOK1_STANLEY

2008]

12/3/2008 12:07:44 PM

DIGITAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE

203

puters themselves . . . .” 142 While Simpson was resolved in 1998,
before Professor Kerr’s article and the line of cases dealing with
private data on shared computers, there is still generally no distinction between external media recovered along with a computer and
the computer itself. 143
E. Exceeding Authorization Through Technology
In addition to the legal issues surrounding consent searches,
there are technological concerns that must be addressed in determining whether the police have exceeded their search authority.
While they did not specifically address searches of computer systems, the Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United States 144 did discuss
the use of specialized technology in criminal searches. 145 In Kyllo,
the police used thermal imaging to discover “information regarding
the interior of [Kyllo’s] home.” 146 The Court held that use of that
technology constituted a search despite the fact that the officers
never physically entered the home. 147 The Court’s rationale was
based in part on the fact that thermal imaging technology was “not
in general public use,” and in part because the intrusion by the officers was into Kyllo’s home, a space deserving of the highest level
of Fourth Amendment protection. 148
The United States had argued that the thermal imager used in
Kyllo was only able to pick up differences in temperature on the
outside of the home’s wall. 149 The Court found that the imager
still technically searched inside the home, because “such a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment . . . would leave
the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology . . . that

142

Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Grimett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1268–69 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“[L]aw enforcement may not expand the scope of a search beyond its original justification . . . [and the warrant was to] search any computer media found therein.”). See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.10 (4th ed. 2007).
144
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
145
Id. at 35–36.
146
Id. at 35 n.2.
147
Id. at 35–40.
148
Id. at 34.
149
Id. at 35.
143
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could discern all human activity in the home.” 150 That type of “intimate information,” even if obtained without an officer ever entering the home itself, would clearly be considered within the scope
of Fourth Amendment protection. 151 Even though there had been
no physical intrusion into the home, the police technology invaded
Kyllo’s protected privacy interest, and thus the Court held that the
officers had conducted a search. 152
F. Consent Searches and Computer Files—Recent Case Law
1. Trulock v. Freeh
In the wake of Randolph, Rodriguez, and Kyllo, numerous
courts have addressed the questions that arise when the police
search a computer system using a software program like EnCase.
In 2001, the Fourth Circuit heard a case which tested the boundaries of law enforcement activities vis-à-vis shared computers. 153 In
Trulock v. Freeh, 154 the court heard about how FBI agents, investigating an alleged leak of classified information, questioned the
plaintiff’s girlfriend, Conrad, about a computer system that was
shared by both of them. 155 During the questioning, the girlfriend
reported that Trulock had his files stored under a passwordprotected user account to which she did not have the password. 156
While the ultimate issue in the case was not whether the search of
the computer was unlawful, the Trulock court noted that
“[a]lthough Conrad had authority to consent to a general search of
the computer, her authority did not extend to Trulock’s passwordprotected files.” 157

150

Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 34 (“[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding
the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search—at least where (as
here) the technology in question is not in general public use.” (quoting Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961))).
152
Id. at 34–35, 40.
153
Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001).
154
Id.
155
Id. at 398.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 403 (citing United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978)).
151

VOL19_BOOK1_STANLEY

2008]

12/3/2008 12:07:44 PM

DIGITAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE

205

In determining whether Conrad’s consent extended to Trulock’s protected files, the Fourth Circuit made three interesting
findings. First, the court analogized Trulock’s password-protected
area on the computer to a locked footlocker. 158 Second, the court
found that Trulock’s actions in protecting his files and withholding
the password from Conrad established a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 159 And finally, the court held that, because the law had
been unsettled at the time the agents conducted the search and the
agents could have reasonably believed that Conrad’s consent was
effective, they were entitled to immunity from the civil action
against them. 160 However, Trulock left the law unsettled on the
main issue of whether one user of a shared computer could ever
consent to a search of the other user’s password-protected files. 161
2. United States v. Buckner
The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Buckner, 162 tackled this
issue six years later, upholding the legality of a search under the
apparent authority doctrine. 163 The court sua sponte raised a separate argument regarding the methodology the police used to search

158

Id. (“Trulock’s password-protected files are analogous to the locked footlocker inside the bedroom.”).
159
Id. (“By using a password, Trulock affirmatively intended to exclude Conrad and
others from his personal files. Moreover, because he concealed his password from Conrad, it cannot be said that Trulock assumed the risk that Conrad would permit others to
search his files. Thus, Trulock had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the passwordprotected computer files and Conrad’s authority to consent to the search did not extend to
them.”).
160
Id. at 403–04.
161
Id. at 404 (“[W]e are aware of no reported cases answering whether an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in password-protected files stored in a shared
computer. Trulock, though conceding the absence of computer specific caselaw, urges us
to recognize a clearly established right based upon Block and other similar cases. We
decline to do this. Although cases involving computers are not [sui generis], the law of
computers is fast evolving, and we are reluctant to recognize a retroactive right based on
cases involving footlockers and other dissimilar objects.”).
162
United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551 (4th Cir. 2007).
163
Id. at 555 (“As long as the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . warrant a
[person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority, apparent authority to consent exists, and evidence seized or searched pursuant to that consent
need not be suppressed.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968))).
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Buckner’s computer. In a footnote, the court stated that neither
party argued “that the police officers deliberately used software
that would avoid discovery of any existing passwords.” 164 Since
the issue was not contended, the court declined to rule on the merits, but noted in another footnote that the apparent authority doctrine would not likely extend to a situation where the police intentionally ignored a user’s password protection. 165
Such a
distinction, given the current state of technology, may sit on a very
fine line, and as such the outcome of Buckner may have been quite
different had Buckner argued that the technology allowed the police to bypass his password-protection.
3. United States v. Andrus
Most recently, the Tenth Circuit has confronted similar issues
to those raised by Trulock and Buckner. In United States v.
Andrus 166 the Tenth Circuit held, consistent with the Fourth Circuit
opinions, that the apparent authority doctrine provided the basis for
a search of a computer even when the consenter did not have actual
authority to consent to the search. 167 In a divided decision, the
Andrus court upheld a search of a computer that was available for
use by three members of the Andrus family. 168 The consenter was
the defendant’s father and the search occurred when the defendant
was not home. 169 The court relied heavily on the Randolph line of
cases to establish the validity of the search based on the father’s
apparent authority. 170
The Andrus court went further into the analysis and looked,
like the Trulock court did, to analogize the computer to a physical
container in order to determine the level of protection to afford it

164

Id. at 553 n.1.
Id. at 555 n.3 (“We do not hold that the officers could rely upon apparent authority
to search while simultaneously using mirroring or other technology to intentionally avoid
discovery of password or encryption protection put in place by the user.”).
166
United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711 (10th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc denied, 499
F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2007).
167
Id. at 722.
168
Id. at 712, 721.
169
Id. at 713–14.
170
Id. at 716–17.
165
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under the Fourth Amendment. 171 The court found, as courts before
it had and as Orin Kerr has suggested, that the files stored on the
computer were analogous to a footlocker or suitcase. 172 What the
Andrus court then struggled with was how to deal with the fact that
the defendant Andrus’s files were password-protected such that
Andrus’s father could not normally access them. 173 This sticking
point is the heart of the debate in the Andrus decision and in resolving the larger question of how to treat warrantless searches of
modern computer systems.
It is worth noting that the Andrus majority did recognize a
problem in allowing the agents to conduct a search of the computer
when it became clear that Dr. Andrus did not have actual authority
to consent to a search of his son’s files.174 At issue in the case, and
in this Note, is whether law enforcement may, in a similar situation
with a shared computer, continue to rely on a consenter’s apparent
authority at all when there are technological options that allow the
agents to easily exceed the scope of consent. 175 If not, then the
first step in any search of a shared computer system must be to determine the scope of the consenter’s access, and no evidence
should be analyzed or recovered prior to that determination being
made.
II. BRIDGING THE GAP: APPLYING PHYSICAL CONSENT RULES TO
DIGITAL MEDIA
When police officers conduct consent searches, they are limited to looking only at areas they reasonably believe are under the
control of the consenter. But, as noted in the three recent cases
that have dealt with consent searches of computer systems, there
are two questions that must be answered to determine whether the

171

Id. at 718; see also Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001).
Andrus, 483 F.3d at 718; see also United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 554 (4th
Cir. 2007); Trulock, 275 F.3d at 403; United States v. Aaron, 33 F. App’x 180, 184 (6th
Cir. 2006); Kerr, supra note 6, at 555.
173
Andrus, 483 F.3d at 718–19, 721.
174
Id. at 722.
175
Id. at 724 (McKay, J., dissenting).
172
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police action is objectively reasonable. 176 The first is whether
there has been a manifestation of the user’s expectation of privacy. 177 That can be accomplished either overtly by the user encrypting or protecting her individual files or, as has been argued,
could be assumed by the police due to the ubiquity of password
protected user accounts and the ways that modern operating systems are configured. The second question is whether the expectation exhibited by the user is recognized by society as reasonable. 178
Beyond those two fundamental questions, Kyllo instructs courts to
inquire whether the tools used by the police in their investigation
are designed, and employed, to bypass the user account passwords
that may have been put in place. 179
A. Manifesting an Expectation of Privacy
1. Judge McKay’s Andrus Dissent
The problem raised by the majority’s opinion in Andrus, according to Judge McKay, is that the court failed to consider that
the EnCase program used by the agents to search the Andrus computer was designed to find files irrespective of any password protections implemented at the user account level. 180 Two legal issues
are at the core of this argument: (1) that the user has manifested his
intent to keep the data private; and (2) whether the technology used
by the police goes beyond the scope of the authorized search.181 In
his dissent, Judge McKay argued that EnCase is designed in a way
that ignores the user-level password protections that many users

176

See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
178
Id.
179
See United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 39 n.6 (2001) (noting that the Court can,
and has in the past, made determinations about what type of activities are “routine”); DOJ
MANUAL, supra note 13, at pt. (I)(B)(5) (“Use by the government of innovative technology not in general public use to obtain information stored on or transmitted through computers or networks may implicate this rule from Kyllo . . . . although courts have not yet
defined the standard for determining whether a given technology meets this requirement.”).
180
Andrus, 483 F.3d at 722 (McKay, J., dissenting).
181
Id. at 723.
177
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implement. 182 But he tempered his argument with the recognition
that sometimes the police cannot determine, through the technology, whether a consenter has the ability to access another user’s
files even though the accounts are password-protected. 183 Ultimately, Judge McKay argued that the police officers conducting
this investigation should, at the very least, have inquired into the
father’s access to the computer prior to gaining his consent and
conducting their search. 184
The majority, on the other hand, interpreted the apparent authority doctrine as authorizing the police activity because the majority felt the police had enough evidence that the defendant’s father was an authorized user of the computer. 185 But an authorized
user of the computer may not be able to access every file on the
computer just like a mother may not be able to access her son’s
locked footlocker. 186 The Andrus judges all considered this technical issue, but could not agree on the proper resolution.187
The Randolph Court was very clear in tying Fourth Amendment protections to an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 188 In the computer context, the courts have always been
willing to protect individual files that a user has password protected or encrypted, but they have not gone as far as protecting
data stored in an unprotected form, but in a folder only accessible
by one user. 189 The Andrus court struggled with the issue of how a
user’s privacy is manifested with regard to those types of files. 190
The court seemed to recognize at least three different ways of ad182

Id.
Id. at 723 n.3 (“I recognize that the ability of users to program automatic log-ins and
the capability of operating systems to ‘memorize’ passwords poses potential problems,
since these only create the appearance of a restriction without actually blocking access.”).
184
Id. at 724 (“The burden on law enforcement to identify ownership of the computer
was minimal. A simple question or two would have sufficed.”).
185
Id. at 720–21.
186
Id. at 717–18; United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978).
187
Compare Andrus, 483 F.3d at 720, with id. at 724–25 (McKay, J., dissenting).
188
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006).
189
See Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001); Steven E. Henderson, Nothing
New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search,
56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 530–35 (2005) (arguing against Orin Kerr’s notion that encryption itself does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy).
190
See Andrus, 483 F.3d at 718–19.
183
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dressing this issue: (1) the police can freely search the computer
relying on the apparent authority of the consenter so long as the
computer is located in a common area in the home; 191 (2) the police can be required to inquire about the level of access the consenter has before conducting their search; 192 and (3) the police can
use technological measures to determine whether a user has manifested a desire to protect her files. 193 The crux of the first part of
this debate, then, is what steps must users take to clearly manifest
their intention to keep their data private?
2. Mandatory Inquiry into Consenter’s Access
The apparent authority doctrine requires only that a reviewing
court look to whether the police officers had a reasonable belief
that the consenter had access to the area they have asked to
search. 194 In a situation where a computer is located in a common
area in a home and the consenter is a family member who lives in
the home, the police might reasonably believe that the consenter
has access to the computer, but a more searching inquiry may be
required. 195 If the police were to ignore information that would
make a reasonable person believe the consenter lacked actual authority to grant consent the search would be in clear violation of
the reasonable inquiry rule set forward by Rodriguez. 196 The objective standard by which police action should be judged in cases
involving consent searches of computer equipment is very hard to
establish because of the inherent ambiguities pointed out by the
Andrus majority. 197 However, the Court clearly established in
Rodriguez that it is precisely when the situation is ambiguous that
the obligation to inquire attaches. 198

191

See id. at 719.
Id. at 725 (McKay, J., dissenting).
193
Cf. id. at 723–24 (noting that the agents discovered the password protection after
they began analyzing the computer with forensic investigation software).
194
See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990).
195
See Andrus, 483 F.3d at 725 (McKay, J., dissenting) (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at
188).
196
See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188–89.
197
See Andrus, 483 F.3d at 717–22.
198
Id. at 724–25 (McKay, J., dissenting); see also Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188.
192
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If, as the Andrus majority noted, the use of password-protected
accounts poses difficulties for police in determining where the
borders of one user’s consent ought to be drawn, then Judge
McKay is right, and the police officers should be required to, at the
very least, ask about the consenter’s level of access to the computer. Such an inquiry would be a quick and easy way for the police to discover whether the user had manifested an intent to keep
her data private. Of course, the Court’s caveat about lying consenters must remain in place if the police are only required to ask
about the consenter’s level of access, but technology could make
even that inquiry insufficient. 199
3. Is Password Use Ubiquitous?
Mr. Andrus argued that the police should have known that the
shared computer would have multiple password-protected accounts
on it, but the court noted that the defendant never offered any evidence that would “demonstrate a high incidence of password protection among home computer users.” 200 But Judge McKay questioned the majority, asking what evidence the defendant could have
introduced that would constitute “sufficient proof of the prevalence
of password protection . . . .” 201 If the agents were aware that most
users choose to employ password protection on their computers,
the Andrus majority noted, then perhaps the agents would have
been required to inquire about the consenter’s access, but the majority found no evidence to suggest the police could have reasonably suspected that such protections were enabled. 202 The majority
ignored, however, that the agents investigating Mr. Trulock, approximately six years prior to the investigation into Mr. Andrus’s
activities, had asked Conrad about passwords during their ques-

199

The Rodriguez Court acknowledged that police could be misled by consenters, purposefully or not, and since the legal inquiry is the objective one of whether a reasonable
person in the same position would have believed the consenter had authority to allow the
search, the reviewing court should not hold the police liable for the consenter’s deception. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186–88.
200
Andrus, 483 F.3d at 721.
201
Id. at 723 (McKay, J., dissenting).
202
Id. at 721–22, 722 n.8.
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tioning. 203 The majority seemed to contradict itself by noting in
one case that, “[b]ecause intimate information is commonly stored
on computers, it seems natural that computers should fall into the
same category as suitcases, footlockers, or other personal items,”
but then failing to apply that analysis to the agents’ conduct in the
second case. 204 This contradiction occurred because the majority
considered the computer a self-contained physical device, not a
data storage system which should be treated as multiple logical devices. 205
B. EnCase, Kyllo, and Unreasonable Searches
The Andrus court’s analysis of the difficulties inherent in determining whether a user has enabled password protection for his
account can be exacerbated by the realities of the physical-digital
distinction. As stated earlier in this Note, users can enable passwords on their accounts and effectively prevent other users of the
system from accessing their files. 206 But those protections are abrogated when someone with physical access to the computer uses a
program that looks directly at the data on the hard drive and bypasses the operating system’s security features. The Buckner
Court specifically noted, in upholding the search allowed by Buckner’s girlfriend, that if the officers intentionally ignored or used
techniques that would avoid detecting password protections they
would not be able to rely on the apparent authority doctrine to justify the search. 207
While courts have been divided about how strictly to apply the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant particularity requirement to searches
of computer hard drives, investigators are advised to specify, in the
warrant, the types of files they are seeking. 208 Should the investi-

203

Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 398 (4th Cir. 2001).
Andrus, 483 F.3d at 718.
205
See Kerr, supra note 6, at 438–40 (discussing the differences between physical
searches of homes and searches of data on hard drives).
206
See supra Part I.A.
207
United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 555 n.3 (4th Cir. 2007).
208
See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that
agents exceeded the scope of a warranted search when they stopped looking for evidence
of drug-related crimes and began looking for child pornography). But see United States v.
204
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gator inadvertently discover evidence of a type not specified in the
warrant, she should seek additional authority before searching for
further evidence of that type. 209 In addition, a debate exists between the Fifth and Tenth Circuits as to whether investigators exceed the scope of consent when they search different areas of a
hard drive than those they initially asked to see. 210 Whether a
search is improper because of the inherent nature of the tool used
to conduct it is another inquiry altogether.
The Kyllo Court was concerned with the application of technology that allowed the police to do things that the general public
could not do, essentially looking through a wall. 211 To make clear
how EnCase could be inherently violative of the Fourth Amendment, consider the following two hypotheticals, similar to Kyllo
and George Costanza’s situation from this Note’s introduction.
Assume that Kozmo Kramer was growing marijuana in a closet
in the basement of his home and that his girlfriend, Elaine Benes,
only entered the basement once a week to do laundry. Mr. Kramer
keeps the door to his grow-room locked with a padlock to which
only he has the key. He has told his girlfriend that he keeps the
door locked because there are very valuable family heirlooms in
there, and he only has one key to the lock, which he keeps in his
pocket at all times. Because Mr. Kramer is incredibly careful to
mask the odor of the marijuana plants, Ms. Benes is totally oblivious to Mr. Kramer’s illicit activities until one day, when Mr.
Kramer is not at home, the DEA knocks on the door. The DEA
agents inform Ms. Benes that they believe her boyfriend has an illegal marijuana farm in the house and they would like to take a

Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922, 926–28 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding a warranted search where the
agents found pornography while conducting a search for business records), vacated en
banc, then reinstated in part, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008).
209
See United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 530–31 (E.D. Va. 1999) (upholding a
search where officers obtained a second warrant before searching for child pornography
when the warrant had been drafted to allow searching for evidence of computer hacking).
210
Compare Carey, 172 F.3d at 1274, with United States v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670, 680
(5th Cir. 2002) (holding that once a search of a portion of the defendant’s computer has
been justified, the defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the data on the
computer). But see Kerr, supra note 6, at 576–82 (arguing that a new approach to the
plain view doctrine is necessary for computer evidence).
211
See supra Part I.E.
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look around. Ms. Benes is shocked to hear that her boyfriend
would be involved in something like that, and so she gives them
permission to search the home.
Obviously, when the agents reach the locked door in the basement, they will see the padlock. Even if, hypothetically, there was
no overt sign of a lock, when they tried to open the door the agents
would find that they could not access the room. But, and this is
where Orin Kerr’s distinctions between digital and physical
searches are extremely relevant, if the police chose to, instead of
physically searching the house, use a thermal imager to scan for
rooms with heat signatures matching marijuana grow lights, would
the discovery of the locked room in the basement violate Mr.
Kramer’s Fourth Amendment rights?
On one hand, Ms. Benes consented to a search of the home,
and the police may have even informed her that they would be using thermal imaging in the course of that search. On the other
hand, however, without the aid of that technology, the police
would never have been able to obtain access to or discover that
room, and it is clear that Ms. Benes has no right to consent to a
search of it. 212
Now imagine that the shared home computer is what the agents
want to examine. If Mr. Kramer had encrypted his data and locked
it away from his girlfriend, any court would likely rule that the
agents cannot break the lock. 213 But if he chose to secure his private data by locking the computer with different passwordprotected accounts so that his girlfriend could log on to occasionally play solitaire and his secret activities would remain that way,
under the Andrus ruling, the same protections would not apply. 214

212

See United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978). Note, however, that
if the two were married, the consent that the wife gives to search the house could arguably be extended to allow access to all the rooms, even the ones where the husband has
forbidden the wife to go. See, e.g., Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir.
1948) (noting that even when a spouse is no longer residing in the marital home, “the
right of [defendant’s wife] to enter the house cannot be seriously questioned . . .”). Such
a situation is beyond the scope of this Note.
213
See United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 717 (10th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc denied, 499 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2007).
214
See id. at 716.
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In that situation, the use of EnCase is almost exactly analogous to
the use of the thermal imager, because the agents conducting the
search are using software that was specifically designed to search
through a hard drive without considering the locks put in place at
the user-account level. 215
Judge McKay’s dissent in Andrus made clear that he thought
EnCase was a problematic tool in the context of a consent
search. 216 In the subsequent decision where the Tenth Circuit denied rehearing in the case, the court noted that the only valid issue
raised in the petition for rehearing was whether the defendant’s father’s consent was sufficient and the argument “premised on Kyllo
v. United States . . . was made for the first time in [the] petition for
rehearing and was . . . therefore forfeited.” 217
III. FORENSIC INVESTIGATORS MUST ATTEMPT TO DISCOVER
PASSWORD PROTECTED ACCOUNTS PRIOR TO CONDUCTING
CONSENT SEARCHES
If, during the course of a forensic investigation on a computer
hard drive acquired pursuant to a consent search, the investigator
realizes that there are password protections enabled for one of the
accounts, the investigator should stop looking at the data and attempt to confirm that the consenter had access to the files before
continuing the search. 218 The process for determining whether accounts are password protected using EnCase is trivial. Running
the script that EnCase uses to display the account information takes
mere seconds of investigator time and can be run after the seizure
but before any data are exposed. Since Rodriguez requires that the
police at least inquire about the authority of the consenter, 219 it
would make sense that if they could definitively ascertain whether
the computer had password protection prior to beginning their

215

See id. at 723 (McKay, J., dissenting).
Id.
217
United States v. Andrus (Andrus II), 499 F.3d 1162, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (denying
rehearing en banc).
218
See Andrus, 483 F.3d at 724 (McKay, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 555 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2007)).
219
See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188–89 (1990).
216
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analysis, they should be required to do so. 220 This method does
not eliminate all of the problems that simple inquiry would have
(e.g., consenters can still lie about their access rights to the computer), but it does make certain that the police have done all they
reasonably can do before beginning their search. It is irrelevant,
then, whether or not password use is commonplace among users of
home computers, because the investigator can tell whether the specific computer about to be analyzed is protected.
A determination that the computer has some passwordprotected accounts does not mean that a search of the computer
would be unlawful. It may be the case that the password-protected
account is shared between multiple users. It is possible that, as
Judge McKay pointed out in Andrus, the computer is configured
with a password-protected account that automatically logs in when
the computer is powered on. 221 Further, the consenter’s account
may be an administrator account and might be able to access all of
the data on the hard drive. In situations where the consenter’s
level of access cannot be determined by the technology alone, the
police should conduct an inquiry before continuing the investigation. A multi-user computer system presents an inherent ambiguity
in whether the consenter has access to all of the data on the hard
drive, and when that ambiguity exists the police must conduct a
reasonable inquiry to determine what the consenter’s level of access is.
The use of EnCase and software like it poses a very significant
problem in the context of consent searches. By its very nature, the
software ignores certain security features that the computer operating system provides. Users who have chosen to protect their data
from the co-users by enabling password-protected accounts would
likely expect that their co-users cannot access their data. They
possess an expectation of privacy similar to the expectation one
might have if she kept her valuables in a locked safe. What many
users do not know, however, is that cracking that safe is as simple
as looking at it from a different angle. But it would be a critical er-

220

Even if the software provided imperfect results, it would at least provide a basis for
the investigator to question the scope of the consenter’s access.
221
See Andrus, 483 F.3d at 723 n.3 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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ror for a court to hold that a search using technology like EnCase is
permissible when it specifically bypasses those security features.
Perhaps users should know that their data are not as secure as they
might think, but that argument could also be used to legitimize the
search in Kyllo, since it is conceivable that people are aware that
thermal imaging technology exists. Mr. Kyllo could have put his
grow-lamps in a room built out of material which dissipated the
heat and made thermal imaging ineffective, but to require that kind
of manifestation of an expectation of privacy goes well beyond the
constitutional protections from unreasonable searches. The courts
should not sanction the use of technologies that evade reasonable
security protections no matter how weak they are.
A. The Future
Heavy computer users know that even the largest internal hard
drive can quickly be filled with data. Users have been copying
their data to external storage devices for decades as a means of
preserving their data. 222 Now, however, zip disks are slow and expensive, so users are saving their back-up data on external hard
drives. 223 One of the technologies to recently jump from the office
to the home computing environment is the network hard drive. 224
These are standalone data storage devices which are accessed via a
user’s home network. 225 Users of these network drives can choose
to configure multiple user accounts just like they can on their computers. 226

222

There are many ways a computer user can backup her data. Users generally copy
data to an external disk which, in the past, would have been a floppy disk. See IBM Archives: 20th Century Disk Storage Chronology, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/
exhibits/storage/storage_chrono20.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008); Wikipedia—Floppy
Disk, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Floppy_disk (last visited Aug. 25, 2008) (historical
perspective on the development of the external disk dating back to the 1970s).
223
See, e.g., Maxtor OneTouch 4 Plus, http://www.maxtor.com/en/external-drives/
external-hard-drive/index.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
224
See Western Digital—My Book World Edition 1 TB Hard Drives, http://www.
wdc.com/en/products/Products.asp?DriveID=347 (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
225
Id.
226
WESTERN DIGITAL, MY BOOK WORLD EDITION USER MANUAL 35–38 (2007), available at http://www.wdc.com/en/library/usb/2779-701026.pdf.
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Unlike a stand-alone computer, however, the forensic technology may not be able to easily discover whether there are passwords
in place which restrict access to certain files. As well, a coinhabitant may not be aware that another co-inhabitant has installed such a device on the network. The issue that courts may
soon need to resolve is whether to treat these hard drives like other
external media (e.g., CD-ROMs, Zip Disks, etc.), or computers
themselves.
By treating these network drives like other external media, the
court would sanction police seizure and search of the data on them,
just as in Andrus, and the only way a user could protect herself
from such a search would be to password-protect or encrypt the individual files. To require encryption in the case of a storage
mechanism that is password-protected, based on the inquiry requirement imposed in Trulock, 227 would be an unreasonable burden on users.
As storage devices become more sophisticated and integrate
certain functions normally reserved only to stand-alone computers,
the line between what is external media and what is a computer
will continue to be blurred. Certainly, courts should approach
these new technologies just as they approach any new technology:
by applying the rules of law from the most analogous situations to
the new one the court faces. 228 As the courts encounter these new
storage technologies that allow users to secure their data from
other users of the same device, they should construe the restrictions on law enforcement activity as narrowly as possible in order
to protect an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 229

227

See Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402–03 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964)).
228
See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
229
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that has emerged
from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).

